MANAGEMENT

OF THE

Present War

AGAINST

FRANCE

CONSIDER'D.

IN A

LETTER

TO A

Noble Lord.

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By a Person of Quality.

i.e. Edward Littleton, M.A.

LONDON,

Printed for *R. Clavel*, *C. Wilkinson* and *J. Hindmarsh*, and are to be sold by *Randal Taylor* near *Stationers-Hall*, 1690.

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CONSIDER'D.

YOU did me the great Favour, My Nobleſt Lord, to peruſe my Obſervations upon the War of *Hungary*, ſome time before they were Printed. And You were pleaſed to give them your Approbation. Wherein, 'tis like, your Friendſhip and Candour might prevail much upon your Judgment. Your Lordſhip doth at preſent diſpenſe with my Continuation of that Work, (which indeed I have but faintly, or rather have not promiſed): and You demand my Opinion of that which more neerly concerns us, namely, the preſent War of the Confederates againſt the *French* King.

Without making Excuſes, to which I have too juſt a Title, I humbly return this Anſwer; that according to my weak apprehenſion of things, the grand Error of the *Hungarian* War, hath now been acted over again by the Confederates. I think I have ſhewed plainly in thoſe Obſervations, that the *Chriſtians* did greatly miſtake in falling upon *Buda*: thereby attacquing their Enemy in his Strength: by

which they exposed themselves to great Hazards and Losses, brought infinite prejudice to their Affairs, and retarded their Conquests which might otherwise have been swift and easy. And the same may be said of the Sieges of *Mentz* and *Bon*: which have caused so great an Expence, of pretious Time, and Bloud, and Treasure.

At the beginning of the Campagne the Confederates were in a dreadful posture: having such a Force in the Field, as hath seldom been seen in *Europe*. Their several Armies were reckoned to make up a hundred and seventy thousand Men: and surely by the most moderate Computation, they must be above a hundred and forty thousand. There were above twenty thousand in the Duke of *Bavaria*'s Army: the Imperial Troops under the Duke of *Lorrain* were about the same number: and those of *Saxony*, *Hesse*, and *Lunenbourg*, could not be less than thirty thousand. These were in the upper Parts of the *Rhine*; and put together, made up seventy thousand Men. Then in the lower Parts, the *Spanish* Army, with the Troops of *Liege* and *Munster* added to it, was above twenty thousand: and the whole *Dutch* Force, with that of *Brandenburg*, were neer upon fifty thousand. So that the Total of these amounted to seventy thousand likewise.

Here now were two mighty Armies: which if they had march'd forward, would have made *France* to shake. Yet it is confess'd, that 'twas very possible they might have made no great progress or impression, if they had been oppos'd by an equal Force, or any thing neer equal. But the Matter was clear otherwise. For the *French*, notwithstanding they had quitted so many Places beyond the *Rhine*, could get but a small Force in the Field this year. Their Generals in these Parts were *Humieres* and *Duras*. Under *Humieres* there might by thirty thousand Men: but we do not find that *Duras*, though joyn'd by the flying Armies (or Parties) of *Monclar*, *Montal*, and *Boufflers*, could ever make twenty.

It may here be demanded, what became of their Men? for even those that were drawn out of the Towns they quitted,

quitted, would have made a good Army. To this I answer; that their Men were bestowed in those strong Places they held upon the *Rhine*, to fill them with very strong Garrisons. They plainly made this their Barrier against the mighty Force that threaten'd. By the great Resistance these Garrisons were like to make, in case they were attacqued, they might well hope to keep their Enemies at the armes End, and stave off the War from *France*. And it may truly be affirm'd, that the chief strength of the *French* Monarchy lay now in these Garrisons.

The *French* Garrisons upon the *Rhine*, at the opening of the Campagne, were these that follow; *Hunningen*, *Brisach*, *Strasburg* with the dependencies, *Fort Louis*, *Philipsburg*, *Mentz*, *Bon*, *Keyserwert*, and *Rhinberg*. And these took up the whole length of that River from *Swisserland* to *Holland*: only the *Germans* had the great City of *Collen* between *Keyserwert* and *Bon*, and *Coblentz* between *Bon* and *Mentz*. But moreover beyond the *Rhine*, or on the *French* side of it, the *Germans* had all *Flanders* at their devotion; with the Dutchy of *Juliers*, and the Dioceſs of *Liege*.

This being the Condition of Affairs, the great Question is, Whether it were better for the Confederates to attacque these very strong Places upon the *Rhine*, or to March straight into *France*. And it seems very evident, that the marching into *France* had been more advisable.

Let any man of reason consider, what were the Sentiments of the *French* King; when there was a mighty Force against him, which he was no way able to withstand. I say, let it be consider'd, which of these two things he most dreaded: whether their Sitting down before some of his remote Garrisons, or their falling with the whole weight of the sevenscore thousand Men, into the Bowels of his Kingdom. I think there is no doubt, but that he most dreaded this later. For in the former he had his Wish: He saw his design succeeded: and things fell out just as he would have them. He had left those Garrisons there, for that very End and Purpose. He could

not hope but that these Places would be taken at last: for he never so much as attempted their Relief. But his hopes were, that his Enemies would spend their Time and their Strength upon them. And I dare say he wishes with all his Soul, that they would do the like next year.

The Miseries of a defensive War (I mean where the Enemy is cleerly an Over-Match) are beyond Expression. *David* chose rather to submit to a Pestilence, then to fly before the Enemy for three Months: which is the Condition of those that are upon the defensive, against Enemies much stronger then themselves. And this must have been the Condition of *France* for the last whole Summer, and the whole Winter too, had the Confederates march'd forward.

The great and swift Conquerours in all Ages (such as the *Cimbrians* of old, and after them the *Goths*, *Vandals*, and *Lombards*) never lay pelting at Frontier Garrisons, but broke into the Countries; overwhelming and seizing whole Countries. And the Confederates might have done so now. You'll say the strength of modern Fortifications makes Conquests now more slow and difficult. Not at all. for Places were stronger in the old times, then they are at present: that is, they were harder to be taken. The Engines of Assailing being now so violent, that there is no Fence against them. No place is now impregnable (says a Man of Skill) unless it be inaccessible. *Roban.*

The Confederates were now cleerly Masters of the Field: which is a glorious Condition. To be Master of the Field is the Soldiers delight. He that is cleerly Master of the Field, if he understand his Business, will not want any thing. And he hath this very great advantage, that he may fall upon his Enemy where he is worst provided. But if he fall upon him where he is best provided, he loses and throws away that great advantage. And this the Confederates have done, by attacquing the strong Garrisons upon the *Rhine*, and particularly *Mentz* and *Bon*. Both which Places the *French* had been fortifying all Winter, with extreme diligence; and had put seven

or

or eight thousand Men into *Bon*, and into *Mentz* ten or twelve thousand. I know that, at the beginning of these Sieges, we had an account of far lesser numbers. But he that shall consider, how many marched out of those Places when they were surrender'd; and shall consider likewise, what loss of Men the Defendants must sustain, in Sieges of that length, carried on with so great Forces, and with so much Vigour and Violence; may reasonably conclude, that the Garrisons could not be less numerous at first, then I have made them.

But why don't I likewise find fault with the besieging of *Rhinberg* and *Keyserwert*? I answer, Because these Places were quickly and easily taken. You'll say, This is to judge of things by the Event. I own it: but withall I add, that it is a good way of judging in matters of this natu re. The besieging and taking of Towns is a thing wherein Men of Skill go upon Certainties, and wherein Fortune hath little or no share. So that if the design succeed, we may conclude that it was advisable. In the former Confederate War against the *French*, we might observe, that where ever the *French* attacqu'd any Town, they carried it with Ease and Speed. (Never speak of *Mons*, for that was only a Blockade.) But the Confederates were often repulsed; and what they got, was with extreme difficulty. From whence we may safely make a Judgment, that the *French* did manage their Affairs with greater Skill.

Where a Siege proves long and bloudy, either the Difficulties are unexpected, or they were foreseen. If they are unexpected, this shews that the Assailants did unskilfully mistake their measures. And surely a Workman that cannot take his measures aright, is of no value. But if they foresaw the difficulties of the Undertaking, and yet did wilfully engage in it; the Error is yet more inexcusable, and it shews a greater want of Judgment.

In the Preface to my Observations I made a short (but honourable) mention of the Prince of *Baden*. And your Lordship knows, that that Preface was both written and printed, before we heard of any of that Prince's Actions last Summer. But

But by what he had done before, I had great Confidence and Assurance (which also I expressed often) that he would do better then other Men. This brave Prince, if we will consider things aright, hath chiefly got his Glory by falling upon easy things, and by avoiding the difficult. The first time that he acted separately was after the Taking of *Buda*: when he fell into the *Turks* lower *Hungary*, late in the year, with part of the Army which had been so sorely harrased and maul'd at that Siege. The chief Fortress the *Turks* had in those Parts was *Zigeth*: and it lay fairly before him, but it was too strong for him. Had he attacqu'd it, it might have proved another *Buda*. he might perhaps have besieged it one year, and have taken it the year following. and in the mean time all other things must be left undone. Wherefore he wisely pass'd it by; and took other work in hand. And in a short space of time, he subdued all the rest of that Country.

The next year, after the Battel of *Harsan*, he was called away by some Occasions. and General *Dunwalt* did very well supply his place: by the same Methods, subduing most part of *Slavonia* with small Force. But the year after, while the main of the *Christian* Force was engaged against *Belgrade*, this Prince invaded *Bosnia*: where he made great Conquests, and took every place that he attacqued. But he did not think fit to attacque *Seraio*, the Capital City of the Province: which, if he had taken it, would have Crown'd all his Victories. But there was too great a Force within it. He therefore past by it and took *Zwornick*, a place that lay further in: beside other Places. Last year he commanded the main Army: and *Seraio* being of so great importance, he might fairly have thrown away his Men and his Time upon it. But he chose rather to leave it behind him: and he run in as far as *Nissa*. at which Place, and at other Places about it, we know he made short work. Upon the whole, he made a Conquest this year of a great and large Country. And if Places were not fit to be kept, he presently slighted them; if they were fit, he made them better. For he fell hard to work where ever he came. And he hath made it appear; That a good General should take up the *Motto* of the

Roman

Roman Emperour, (I think it was *Pertinax*), *Laboremus*. Thus we see, that this renowned Prince hath accompliſht with ſpeed what ever he undertook; becauſe he undertook nothing, but what he knew he could ſpeedily accompliſh.

I am well informed, that the Duke of *Lorrain* undertook this Siege of *Mentz* full ſore againſt his Will, and at the Inſtance of the other Confederates. And it was juſt ſo formerly with the Emperour *Charles* the fifth. During the diviſions of *Germany* the *French* had ſeized upon *Metz*: and the *Germans*, having made Peace, were mad to recover it. To which Service they went with an Army of a hundred thouſand Men, under the Conduct of that Emperour. And the *French* were in no condition to make head againſt them: only *Metz* was then as well provided for defence, as *Mentz* was now. The wiſe Empetour, who was one of the greateſt Captains of his Age, was cleerly for marching into *France*: where he knew he could eaſily make ſuch Conqueſts, as would (at leaſt) oblige the *French* to an Exchange. But nothing would content the *Germans* but the Siege of *Metz*: they muſt needs attacque their Enemy in his ſtrength. And we know the ill Succeſs of it.

There were other Perſons now, and thoſe no mean ones, to whom this Siege was as little pleaſing as to the Duke of *Lorrain*. Duke *Schomberg* was here at the *Engliſh* Court, when the firſt Tidings came that the Siege of *Mentz* was reſolved upon. And I am well informed likewiſe, that both Duke *Schomberg*, and a greater Man then He, did utterly diſlike the Reſolution, judging the March into *France* to be infinitely more advizable. And I dare ſay that the Prince of *Baden* was of the ſame Mind. Had He been at *Coblentz* (where the Confederates paſs'd the *Rhine*), and might have had his way; he would have choſen much rather to march on to *Paris*, then to march back to *Mentz*. for from *Coblentz* to *Mentz*, by reaſon of the bending of the River, is plainly backward: as any one may ſee, that will look upon the Map of thoſe Countries. Did the Prince ever declare his Mind in this Matter? I do not ſay it.

But

But we may safely presume, that he would have been for falling in upon the *French*, in the same manner as he fell in upon the *Turks*. And he might well hope to have the like Success, and to make the like Impression, with a Power seven times as great.

In the time of the third *Carthaginian* War, when the War was carried on heavily by others, and *Scipio* had laid about him though in an inferiour Command; *Cato* was pleased to say, That *Scipio* only was a Man, and the rest were Shadows. So we may say now, that the Prince of *Baden* hath done great things; and the rest have done nothing, in comparison of what they might have done.

If the Confederates had engaged themselves before *Mentz* only, it had been tolerable. For they might nevertheless have had one mastering overbearing Army, which might have done great Matters. though it would have been much better if they had had two: since each would have found their work easier, the Enemy being distracted and confounded. But their attacquing of *Bon* at the same time, quite disabled them, and compleated the Mischief.

The Mischief of these two Sieges consisted, partly in the Advantages which thereby they lost, and partly in the Disadvantages or Evils they fell under. By these Sieges they lost the grand Advantage, of carrying the War into the Enemies Country: which contains in it many Advantages. In this way they might have maintain'd their Armies at the Enemies Charge. which is no small matter though they could have done nothing else, and though they could have master'd no Places of importance. But many such Places must have fallen into their hands, if they had broke into the Country with an overwhelming Power. For it had been impossible in such a case, that all Places should be well provided for defence; and it had been their own great fault, if they had not fallen upon those that were worst provided. When they had once got past the Frontier, it must be a good Place that could have held out a

Week againſt ſo great Force. Few Places within a Country are compleatly fortified: and thoſe that were beſt fortified would have been an eaſie prey, unleſs they had been likewiſe well manned: and thus to Man all Places had been infinite. Moreover they might have ſeized ſeveral weaker Places, but of commodious Situations, which if (by the example of the Prince of *Baden*) they had taken the pains to fortify, would have been Places of importance.

Theſe things might have been done by the Confederates, in regard their Forces were ſo much ſuperiour. But where the Forces of each ſide are equal, or near an equality, (as it was between the *Dutch* and *Spaniards* for many years); in this caſe he that will be the Aſſailant, if his Enemy be cautious, hath a hard Chapter: ſince he muſt get ground by Inches, and muſt always be doing difficult things. which is now excuſable becauſe it is neceſſary, there being no eaſy things to be done. For if in this caſe he ſhould run into the Country, and leave the ſtrong Frontier Places behind him, the Enemy would hamper him as a Spider doth a Fly. whereas if he had a mighty overbearing Force, the Enemy could do no more harm to him, then a Spider can to a Hornet. But ſince he hath it not, he muſt be content to attacque the Frontier Places, and to clear as he goes. And if he can get one or two of thoſe Places in a Summer, it is a fortunate Campagne.

As it hath been already intimated, where there is an overbearing Force, the way to make ſhort work is to break into the Country. *Guſtavus Adolphus* judg'd it and found it eaſier to conquer *Bavaria*, then to take *Ingolſtat*. if the Grand Viſier, ſeven years ago, could have let alone *Vienna*, his ſubduing the reſt of *Auſtria* had been inevitable. Nor could the Frontier Places he left behind him (as *Raab*, *Veſprin* and *Serinſwar*) have been any hindrance. And ſome think that the High-born Elector, who lately took *Belgrade* with ſo much Gallantry, might in leſs time, and with much leſs difficulty, have over-run and ſubdued both *Servia* and

Bulgaria, and have chaſed *Teghen* Baſſa over Mount *Hæmus*. In like manner it may be here affirm'd; That the Confederates, in all humane Probability, might have made great Conqueſts in *France*, while they lay toyling before *Mentz* and *Bon*. *Let me ſmite him to the Earth at once*, ſaid *Abiſhai* to *David*: *I will not ſmite him a ſecond time*. Even ſo there was now an Opportunity to ſmite the *French* Monarch to the ground: he might have been laid ſo low, as never to riſe more. We might, very probably, have ſeen an end of the War in one Summer.

It hath been ſaid before, that the *French* were but weak in the Field this year. and a powerful Invaſion would have made them yet weaker. This laſt may ſeem a Paradox: but we have a clear Experient of it in the former War of the Confederates. In one of thoſe Campagnes, the Prince of *Conde* commanded about fifty thouſand men in *Flanders*: where he was confronted by an Army of *Dutch* and *Spaniards* of near the ſame number. But after ſome time, the later were joyn'd by a matter of twenty thouſand *Germans*. Whereupon the *Prince* was forced to ſend ten thouſand of his Men, to renforce ſeveral Garriſons: which were now, by the Increaſe of the Enemies Force, in greater danger. The like would have befallen the Marſhal of *Humieres* this laſt year, if the Duke of *Brandenburg*, after the taking of *Keiſerwert*, had marched up to Prince *Waldeck*: with whom the Marſhal had been tugging for ſome time, their Forces being near equal. Whereas now on the contrary, when *Humieres* found that the Duke was engaged before *Bon*, he drew great Numbers out of his Garriſons to renforce his Army. And by this means he became ſtrong enough to carry the War into *Flanders*: where he kept his Army all the latter end of the year, obliging the *Spaniards* and the *Dutch* to draw thither likewiſe.

I might alſo ſhew by another late Expetiment, That the actual Invaſion and breaking in of an over-powering Enemy, doth weaken the Army of the Defendants, by putting them upon

upon ſo ſtrong a Guard of ſo many Places. When the *Grand Viſier* above-mentioned marched againſt *Auſtria*, the Duke of *Lorrain* oppoſed him with Forces much Inferior, and he kept him off a while by the help of *Raab* River. But when the *Viſier* had broke through that Impediment, and was got into the Country, the Duke was forced to divide his Army, thereby to Man ſome Garriſons (and they were but few) that were moſt important. So that his Force in the Field was vaniſh'd and gone. Thus we ſee, that even in theſe matters, *Whoſoever hath, to him ſhall be given, and he ſhall have more abundance; but whoſoever hath not, from him ſhall be taken away, even that he hath.*

I THINK I have made it appear, that the Confederates have loſt great Advantages, by engaging upon hard Sieges on the *Rhine* when they ſhould have invaded *France*. I come now to ſhew, what Evils or Diſadvantages they have fallen under. And ſurely the Evils are neither few nor ſmall, which the Confederates have ſuffered by theſe Sieges.

The firſt Evil I ſhall mention is their loſs of Men. Which muſt needs be very great (whatever Accounts we have had of it) in ſuch continued violent Attacques, finding ſuch ſtout Reſiſtance. And here we muſt obſerve, That in Approaches and raiſing of Batteries, and in Aſſaults and Sallies, we uſually compute the Loſſes by the number of Men that were ſlain out right: not much regarding how many were wounded. When perhaps a great part of theſe might dy afterward of their Wounds, or be diſabled from ever bearing Arms. Moreover we muſt bear in mind, that there was not only great loſs at the very Places beſieged; but by occaſion of theſe Sieges, the Enemy having his free Range the while, many were cut off in other places. To paſs by leſſer matters, *Duras* (in one of his Courſes) is ſaid to have ſent ſome thouſands of the *Bavarians*, into whoſe Quarters he had fallen, Priſoners to *Strasburg*: having killed great numbers likewiſe. And it is confeſſed on all ſides, that eight hundred *Germans*

(some say they were twelve hundred) being lodged in a small Town call'd *Cochem*; the Marquess of *Boufflers* storm'd the Place, and put them all to the Sword. We do not know the reasons, why they were thus exposed.

The second Evil of these hard Sieges was the infinite Expence of Ammunition. Upon which I need not to enlarge, the matter being plain and evident of it self.

Thirdly, Whereas the Confederates might have carried the War into the Enemies Country, by engaging upon these Sieges they kept it in their own. By which means they have been forced to maintain their Armies as it were upon the peny, all at their own Charge and with their own Provisions. Whereas if their Armies had marched into *France*, they would have been there maintained. And that, not only during the Campagne, but also after it. It had been very hard fortune, if they could not in *France* have found or made Winter Quarters. But now, as matters have been order'd, they were forced (when the Campagne was over) to draw their Armies home, and there keep them all Winter.

Fourthly, It is owing to the Sieges of *Mentz* and *Bon*, that a great part of *Germany* now lies in ruines. The *Germans* themselves have been in effect the Authors of this Mischief. They that would engage their whole Force in difficult Sieges, and thereby give advantage to the Enemy to destroy whole Countries with Fire, may justly be accounted the chief *Incendiaries*. Had they marched into *France*, they had been in a condition to retaliate: and this had obliged the Enemy to fair War. Whereas their not being in such a condition, emboldened the *French* to execute those Barbarities. But the *French* durst as well have eaten fire, as made those Fires in *Germany*, had the *German* Armies been then in *France*. Moreover if the *Germans* had been in *France*, no *French* Armies would have been in *Germany*: all must have been drawn back to defend their own. I shall not go about to compute the Damage, which the *French* have done by these Devastations. But by a part we may make some Guess, as

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the whole. In one Course beyond the *Rhine* (the same that hath before been mention'd) we are told that *Duras* burnt twenty thousand Houses. And these being valued but at fifty pound a House one with another, come to a Million of pounds. which is a good deal more, then *Mentz* and *Bon* are worth.

Fifthly, Poor *Flanders* hath felt the dismal Effects of the long Sieges upon the *Rhine*. For it hath last Summer been made the Seat of War; which might have been carried into *France*, had it not been for those Sieges. All the beginning of the year *Humieres* lay encamped at *Nivelle*, between *Mons* and *Brussels*. And Prince *Waldeck*, with the *Dutch* Army, encamped likewise not far from him. At last *Waldeck* advanced (by exceeding slow Marches) and *Humieres* retreated. And now the *Dutch* talk'd of falling into the *French* Quarters: but they never went above ten English Miles beyond *Charleroy*, a Spanish Garrison upon the Frontier. Then *Humieres* takes heart from the *Germans* being engaged before *Bon*, and marches in again to the neighbourhood of *Brussels*: whither he drew Prince *Waldeck* after him, whom the *Spanish* Army now joyn'd. And here they lay, confronting each other, all the latter end of the Campagne. But *Flanders* groaned in the mean time under the burden of three Armies. Such another Campagne would bring it very low.

Sixthly, The other Confederates have also suffer'd much, by the War going on thus heavily. their mighty Force, which with much ado they had got together, and which seem'd sufficient to overturn Kingdoms and Empires, having spent it self in the Taking of two Towns. We see the Emperour knows not which way to turn himself between the *French* and the *Turk*. The other *German* Princes, with whom Money is scarce though they abound with Men, must be hard put to it to maintain their old Troops all Winter, and raise new ones against Spring. The *Dutch* also must strain their utmost, in setting out their Fleets and Armies. Their Commerce is disturbed, and their Charges are exceeding great, and they find

find the burden of this lingring War doth preſs ſore upon them. And even in *England* we feel the Incommodities of the ſlow Work abroad. The difficulties we meet with in reducing *Ireland*; our Loſſes of Ships, our great decay of Trade; the Fall of our Rents, and the heavy Taxes we ly under; all muſt be imputed to the Sieges of *Mentz* and *Bon*, and all might have been prevented by a powerful Invaſion of *France*. which had put the *French* out of condition to conteſt it with us.

Laſtly, By undertaking theſe Sieges, and omitting better things, the Confederates are forced to be all this Winter in a wretched defenſive poſture. All that they aim at, and employ their utmoſt Labour and Diligence upon, is only to ſave their own, and oppoſe the Inſults of the Enemy. Whoſe Country in the mean time is out of their reach, and Themſelves in no condition to requite them.

I HAVE laid before your Lordſhip the Reaſons which induce me to believe; that the Confederates had much better have fallen into *France* it ſelf, then ly toyling a whole Summer about two Out-Garriſons. But there are ſome Objections, which may ſeem very ſtrong againſt the Invading Deſign: and which therefore ought to be well anſwered. And theſe ariſe, either from the Difficulties that muſt attend the Invaſion, or from the Inconveniences that muſt follow upon it other ways.

The main Difficulty objected is the want of Victuals: with which they could not eaſily be ſupplied from home, when they were engaged far and deep in the Enemies Country. But to this I anſwer; that in all likelyhood they would not much need ſuch Supplies, having the Enemies Country at their Command. And they that make this Objection would do well to give us an Example, where an overwhelming Army was ever diſtreſs'd for Victuals. They will have it, if it be above ground; there is no keeping it from them. Therefore we do not read, that the great and ſwift Conquerours

querours before named were ever that way diſtreſs'd. And the like may be ſaid of *Tamerlan*, and *Attila* the *Hunne*: who drew after them ſuch numerous and devouring Armies. Alſo the *Grand Vifier* who of late years broke into *Auſtria*, leaving divers ſtrong Places behind him; hath given full and clear Evidence of this matter. He lay under divers particular diſadvantages in point of Victuals. For he engaged upon the hard and long Siege of *Vienna*, where he was tyed faſt by the Leg: he had firſt with Fire and Sword deſtroyed all the Country near it, and conſequently the Proviſions: and the City ſtanding on the *Danube*, and the *Vifier* having no clear paſſage over it, his Army could range but on the one ſide the River to get Forrage and Victuals. Which things notwithſtanding, he never wanted; and when the Chriſtians forced his Camp, they found there Proviſions in abundance. At the end of the laſt Confederate War, we know *Crequi* marched againſt the Duke of *Brandenburg:* to the farther parts of *Germany*, through ſeveral Countries, over ſeveral great Rivers. Which Expedition, as ſome think, was the moſt Heroick Enterprize in the kind, that hath been known ſince *Hannibal* marched into *Italy*. But what care did he take, and what Proviſion did he make, for Victuals; a thing ſo needful for his Voyage? Truly as far as we can learn, it was not much. It ſeems he made account, that his Army did carry Victuals, and all other Neceſſaries, upon the point of their Swords. And the Duke of *Brandenburg* was no way able to hinder their being ſupplied with thoſe things. Otherwiſe he would never have ſubmitted to the hard terms they impoſed upon him.

But the Objection concerning this difficulty, that is, the want of Victuals, is enforced yet further. 'Tis true, they ſay, a Commanding Army will get it, if it be to be had. But it is not to be had, where the Defendants have themſelves deſtroyed it, by Waſting thoſe parts of their Country in which the Enemy is expected. Which, they add, muſt ſo diſtreſs him, that he cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt. Here now

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is a rare Receipt againſt all Invaſions. For if theſe things hold good, no Conqueſt could be made: and the weakeſt People that are, might defend themſelves againſt the moſt puiſſant Enemy. ſince even the weakeſt People can deſtroy their own Country. But if this device doth ſuch Wonders, why did not the Duke of *Brandenburg* make uſe of it againſt *Crequi*, and the Emperour againſt the Grand Viſier, and the *Bavarian* againſt the *Swede*? And why were not all the other great Conquerours, by this one way defeated and diſappointed? But many things may be eaſily ſaid, which are not ſo eaſily done. And ſurely I think we can hardly find, that ever this deſtroying Device proved effectual, againſt an overwhelming Power, ſuch as the Confederates had now. The thing was ſtrongly attempted in this *France*, when they made their brave and reſolute defence againſt *Cæſar*: but they were not able to go thorough with it. The ſame *France* was invaded by *Attila*: but the thing which then preſerv'd it, was the oppoſing him with an equal Force. Had it not been for that, how could they have turn'd themſelves to this work of deſtroying, when He might have broke in upon them in ſeveral places, with four or five Armies at once, each of them conſiſting of above a hundred thouſand? when alſo every Army might have divided into four or five parts, and every part had been a good Army.

Here we may be told, how *Charles* the fifth was driven out of *Provence*, and this King of *Poland* out of *Moldavia*, by deſtroying or cutting off their Forrage and Victuals. But their Forces were not to compare with the preſent Force of the Confederates: for which reaſon that Inconvenience might be eaſier put upon them. And they were cloſely waited on by Armies near as good as their own. the King by the ſwift and nimble *Tartars*; who infeſted him with great Skill, for ſuch *Barbarians*, as well as Boldneſs and Activity. and the Emperour by the Power of *France*; which was grown ſtrong at laſt, though at firſt it were much inferiour,

inferiour, the Invasion having been sudden and unexpected. Also the Emperor was got into a Nook or Corner of the Country, having the Sea on one side, and on another side the *Rhosne*. And he had likewise, unadvisedly, engaged be a difficult Siege, namely that of *Marseilles*. I think it may truly affirmed, that he did not, in this Expedition, shew so good Conduct as at other times.

But to proceed: This destroying one part of a Country to preserve the other, (if we consider things aright) is a very sad and dismal Remedy. What will they do with the People of those parts that are thus destroyed? Will they cut their Throats? or will they leave them to be starved? or must they be maintain'd by the Countries that are untouch'd? which will be a heavy burden. So that it is no wonder, if this way be seldom practis'd. Moreover it is not a small destruction that will serve the turn in this case; it must extend far and wide. So great a Tract of ground is to be wasted, that the Enemy may be distress'd for Victuals in marching through it, and before he can reach the Countries untouch'd. If there be but three or four days march, it will signifie nothing, nor distress the Enemy in any measure, since he may bring ten or twenty days Provision with him. Victuals Provision for the Men: for as for the Horses, Forrage will be had for them, (in the Summer) even in a wasted Country, there being no way, that we know of, to destroy Grass upon the Ground.

I HAVE answered the grand Difficulty, which seems to attend the Invading Design; that is, the Want of Victuals. Another Difficulty is this: In case the Confederates here should make a large Conquest (which indeed is the thing aim'd at), they would be obliged to Garrison a great many Places: and this taking up great numbers, would very much diminish their Marching Army, so that at length they would want Men. But this is a thing which the Confederates needed not to fear, since they had *Germany* at hand, that great Magazine of Men, (to say nothing of all the North of *Europe* beside);

which would have supplied them with People to any number, if they could find means to maintain them. And the Plunder of *France* had been a high Invitation. In all probability there had been such an Inundation of the Northern People, as hath not been seen of late Ages. Moreover a great number of Garrisons had been no way necessary. The *Romans* kept Countries under, by Armies and not by Garrisons. And a few Garrisons at forty or fifty miles distance, as they would over-spread a large Country, so they would throughly command it. for it must be a weak Garrison, that cannot command twenty or thirty miles round.

There is another Difficulty, which hath some dependence upon this last: and that is, That when the Confederates had distracted their Force by large and remote Conquests, they might with the same speed lose all they had gotten. This might have some weight, if they had only laid hold upon a present Occasion to break in upon an Enemy, who afterwards might prove the stronger. But there was no such danger here. For in all humane probability, the *French* Monarchy had been broken to pieces. I confess the Prince of *Baden* broke in thus upon his Enemy, when he had no advantage over him, save in his own excelling Vertue. And perhaps it may prove difficult to maintain his Conquests. But however he gave the Emperour an Opportunity to make a good Peace; which, considering he was now engaged (or indeed had engaged himself) in another great War, it was his Interest to do. At least it was the Interest of his Confederates, and they should have obliged him to it. It seeming very unreasonable, that They should bear the brunt of the War against *France*, in His Quarrel, while He is making Conquests upon the *Turk*. We are told that the chief difficulty in the Treaty of Peace, was about *Transylvania* and *Walachia*, where the true question was, whether the Protestant Religion in these Countries should continue, by their remaining under the *Turk*; or should be rooted out, by their coming under the Emperour and the Popish Confederates must fight for this also.

Which seems to make good the Saying of the *French* Gazettier, that the Confederates fight for the Emperours Greatness.

I think I have made it appear, that if great Conquests could have been made in *France*, they might have been well maintained. But there is still a Difficulty remaining, and that is, How they should be divided. Which is a thing of no small Consequence; and a disagreement in it might bring all to Confusion. The most natural way in this matter seems to be; That each Army should keep what they got; and They whose Forces compose it, should share according to their several *Quota's*. Or perhaps there may be other ways, that may be thought more convenient. But the Protestants need not trouble their heads with the Methods of dividing the Spoil; for they act, as if they were resolved to get nothing. I will not enlarge in this matter, though I can hardly forbear: and shall only add, That there are two things from which we might hope well in this business of Partition, in case a Conquest had been made. The one is, that the *Germans* (being a sincere Nation and exact Performers of Bargains, and being also accustom'd to intermixt Dominions) would agree better then other People. The other is, that if there must be disagreement, yet they would hardly come to it, till after that the *French* Tyranny had received its fatal Blow. And then perhaps it might have fared with Them, as it did with the old *Romans*, *Postquam remoto metu Punico Simultates exercere vacuum fuit*: which are the words of *Salust*.

I thought that by what hath been said, I had clear'd all Difficulties. But I find it is still the opinion of some Men, that for the Confederate Armies to have marched into *France*, leaving *Mentz* and *Bon* behind them, had been certain Destruction; and that they could not possibly have subsisted. But the great danger here must be from the want of Victuals. whereas I have shewed already, that this danger cannot befall a mastering and much over-matching Force, such as the Confederates now had. Moreover the Confederates, passing the *Rhine* at *Coblentz* and *Collen* (which were theirs) and marching

ſtraight on towards *France*, had not left *Mentz* and *Bon* behind them, but beſide them. For the Places behind them were *Coblentz* and *Collen*. And in their way to *France* there was the Dutchy of *Juliers*, which was in the *Germans* hands: and this brought them to the Land of *Luxenburg*, a *French Conqueſt* (tho now for the moſt part quitted and laid open) joyning upon *France* it ſelf. Alſo a little beſide *Juliers* is the Country of *Liege*, which is *German* likewiſe; and *Flanders* a little further. And here they had the River *Maes* at their Command quite up to *Namur*, which City lies cloſe to the *French* Frontiers. So that to this Place they might have had all Neceſſaries convey'd by Water. A hundred Barks (and how eaſily could *Holland* furniſh a far greater number?) would carry as much as two thouſand Waggons, reckoning each Bark but at twenty Tun. And what hindrance or diſturbance could *Mentz* or *Bon* have given, to the Execution of theſe things?

But I have made it out already, in my Obſervations, that an over-powering Army runs no great hazard, by leaving ſtrong Garriſons behind it. The *Grand Vifier* before mention'd left divers ſtrong Places behind him: and they did him no harm. So the *French* left *Maſtricht* behind them, when they fell upon *Holland* with ſo great Succeſs: and they left *Cambray* behind them, all the while they were making their Conqueſts in *Flanders*: I think it was the laſt Place they took.

But that we may ſee yet more plainly, how little hurt there had been to the Invading Armies, by leaving *Mentz* and *Bon*; let us make a Suppoſition at home, where we better know the Places and Diſtances. Suppoſe then, that *England* were divided into two Warring Kingdoms; the one on the South of *Thames*, the other on the North. Upon which River the Northern men have *London* and *Oxford*, and the Southern men have *Maidenhead* and *Crekelade*: *London* and *Crekelade* being ſomething bigger then the other two; and all of them exceeding ſtrong, and very well mann'd and furniſht. Let us further ſuppoſe, that the Northern men have *Kent* alſo at their devotion: and that they have two mighty Armies, the one at

London

London and the other at *Oxford*, ready to invade the South Parts. Here I would fain know, whether these strong Garrisons of *Maidenhead* and *Crekelade*, can hinder the Army at *London* (who have likewise *Kent* to befriend them) from falling into *Surrey* and *Sussex*; or can hinder the *Oxford* Army from marching to *Newbury* or *Hungerford*, and so into *Hampshire* or *Wiltshire* and whither else they please. And I would likewise know, whether it were now advisable for these mighty Armies, to spend a whole Summer in taking these two Garrisons, by chargeable, laborious, and bloudy Sieges; when as they might probably, in the same time, make an entire Conquest of the Country. No-man of reason, I think, will here affirm; that these Garrisons (as the case is put) could be any hindrance, or that it was necessary or convenient to besiege them. I have, by this Supposition, truly represented the Affair of the Confederates in the lower parts of the *Rhine*. By the Northern Kingdom is meant *Germany*; by the Southern *France*; and by *Kent*, *Flanders*. And *London*, *Maidenhead*, *Oxford*, and *Crekelade* ly up the *Thames*; in the same order as *Collen*, *Bon*, *Coblentz*, and *Mentz* ly up the *Rhine*. Only the Distances upon the *Rhine* are greater. For *Coblentz* is near thirty miles distant from *Bon*, and more then thirty from *Mentz*; whereas from *Oxford* to *Maidenhead* is but twenty five, and to *Crekelade* but twenty.

I HAVE DONE at last with the Difficulties, that might have attended the Invasion of *France* by the Confederates: and am come to the Inconveniences they might have lain under, while their Forces were engaged in this Invasion. The chief of which Inconveniences are these two. First, the Incursions which they must suffer from the *French* Garrisons upon the *Rhine*. Secondly, the loss of the Trade and Navigation of that River.

As to the first, I confess the Incursion of those Garrisons is a great and sore Inconvenience. And what Remedy do I propose against it? Why the same Remedy that the *Hungarians* used against *Newhausell*, *Agria* and *Caniza*; while they were *Turkish* Garrisons, and in their full strength and Vigour. The same that the *Flemmings* did use against *Maestricht*, when the *French* held it, and do now use against *Lisle* and *Tournay*. And the same that the *French* used against *Cambray* and *Landrecy*, while they were in the *Spaniards* hands. The same also that the *Germans* have used these many years against *Brisach*, and for some years against *Strasburg* and *Hunningen*. In a word, the Remedy which all People make use of against Frontier Garrisons. And that is, that the Countries near them submit to Contribution. For there is no other Remedy in the case: there is no *Medium* between Contribution and Destruction.

'Tis natural for Garrisons to command the Countries about them. And he that would hinder them from it, would put a force upon Nature: he may as well endeavour to keep Fire from burning. Or 'tis like the checking of a Fever; which doth but enrage it, and make it more violent. A Garrison is a Disease, which will have its course. and there is no way to prevent or avoid it, but by curing the Disease, that is, by taking the Place. This therefore ought to be endeavour'd, if the thing may be done with ease and convenience. And for this reason the attacquing of *Rhinberg* and *Keiserwert* cannot be dislik'd, because these Places were easily reduced. But if the Work be of great difficulty, it seems the wisest course rather to aim at an Equivalent: that is, to endeavour to get something else (as good or better) upon the Enemy. And in the mean time, we must be content to be under Contribution.

But the Contributions which these Garrisons exact, will perhaps be unreasonable and excessive. I answer, that it is not for their profit to be too hard upon People: thereby

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to drive them from their dwellings, and make a desolation. But the sure remedy for this Evil is the course mention'd just now; that is, to get some Places in the Enemies Country. For then, if They use Our People basely, We can use Theirs as bad. which thing will bring them to reason, if any thing will.

But what if it shall appear, that a powerful Invasion of *France* would be the readiest way to reduce these Places upon the *Rhine*? If you ask how this should be; the answer is, By obliging the Enemy to quit them. We have seen the time, when this *Lewis* the Great hath, upon the like occasion, quitted very important Places on the same River. It was, when the last great Confederacy was formed against him. At which time he took his last leave of *Wesel* and *Burick*, together with *Rees*, *Emerik*, *Schenkschance*, and *Nimegen*, all standing upon this River of *Rhine*: to say nothing of the Towns in *Holland*. In a word, he disgorged all his Conquests in these parts, *Maestricht* and *Grave* excepted. And this he was forced to do, that he might draw his Forces more close, to resist the terrible Storm that threaten'd him. If therefore he threw up so many good Places then, only for fear of an Invasion; how much more must he have done so now, had he been actually Invaded? He must have laid aside the thoughts of keeping rampant Garisons upon the *Rhine*, when *Paris* it self had been in danger: with his dear Palace of *Versailles*, the *Domus aurea* of the French *Nero*.

THUS I HAVE answer'd the Inconvenience first objected; namely, the Mischiefs which might have been done, by the *French* Garisons upon the *Rhine*. But before I proceed to the second, I have something more to say in particular, about *Mons* and *Dol*; and something about *Mentz* only.

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That which I say of *Mentz* and *Bon* is this; that it had been no hard matter, wholly to hinder their Incursions on the *German* side of the *Rhine*. I do still confess, as I have said before, that (ordinarily) there is no hindering of Garrisons (save only by a close Blockade) from commanding the Countries about them. Or if the thing be possible, so great Forces are required to do it, as will devour the Countries in stead of defending them. But the Case of *Mentz* and *Bon* is extraordinary. They both do stand upon the Western or *French* side of the *Rhine*, and on the other side the River, *Mentz* hath the Suburb of *Cassel*, and *Bon* hath the Fort of *Bueil*. But *Bueil* was a thing of no value: being easily taken at the first Bombarding of the Town, and before the Siege was form'd, or so much as resolved on. And *Cassel* was quitted by the *French*, after they had laboured upon it all Winter. a sign of their great weakness and want of Men at that time. I say then, that if the Confederates had well fortified and enlarged these Places, and put strong Garrisons in them; they had thereby secured all the Countries on the *German* side. By this means they had pinn'd up *Mentz* and *Bon* to their own side of the *Rhine*. For the truth is evident of what hath been said in my Observations; That a Town which lies upon a great River, and hath no passage over it, is half block't up.

Having done with *Mentz* and *Bon* conjunctly; let us now consider *Mentz* by it self. This Place, by what hath been done to get it, may seem to be of so great importance, that nothing else might compare with it. But yet we shall find, that (to say nothing now of the general design of Invasion, which gave way to this Siege) other Places in particular, as the City of *Treves* for instance, had been full as good, and might have been had much easier. When the Imperial Army was pass'd the *Rhine* at *Coblentz*, these two Cities lay equally fair for them. They might have marched forty miles forward to *Treves*, or forty miles sideward (or

rather

rather backward to *Mentz*, but to meaſure more exactly, they had ſomething above forty miles to *Treves*, and to *Mentz* ſomething leſs.

The firſt Queſtion then will be; ſuppoſing theſe Places to be equally weak, or equally ſtrong and capacious, which of them is better in reſpect of the Situation? the one ſtanding upon the utmoſt Frontier, and the other forty miles within the Enemies Country. for all thoſe Countries to the Weſt of *Rhine* were now become *French*. To this Queſtion I give this Anſwer; that if the Places be equal in themſelves, their Situation makes no inequality. For the one commands as much ground as the other: and to command the Countries is the chief End of Garriſons. We may well ſuppoſe; that each of theſe Places, with a Garriſon of ten thouſand Men, will command forty miles round. But that which *Mentz* Commands, is ſome of it on the one ſide the *Rhine*, and ſome on the other: that which *Treves* commands is wholly on the one ſide. the having of *Mentz* doth partly eaſe and cleer *Germany*, and partly annoy the *French* Quarters: the having of *Treves* clears nothing, and annoyes twice as much. So that upon the whole matter, and putting one thing againſt another; the Situation makes no inequality, if the Places were equal in themſelves.

But there is a Conſideration, from which one of theſe Places may juſtly be eſteemed better then the other, though of themſelves they were equal: and that is, the preſent poſture of the War, and the ſtrength or weakneſs of the Warring Parties. For if the *Germans* were weaker and upon the defenſive, *Mentz* were more convenient for them, becauſe by having it they might better defend themſelves. But ſince they were now clearly the ſtronger, and upon the Invading hand, *Treves* was more convenient, becauſe it would more advance their Conqueſts. And as I have ſaid in my Obſervations, They that are the ſtronger, ſhould make it their buſineſs to puſh on; and need not fear (but ſhould rather

covery to scatter the War. Which Observations I cite, in regard the Arguments there used in another like occasion, may be applied to this.

Hitherto we have disputed, whether *Mentz* or *Treves* had been better to the *Germans* and more desirable, supposing them to be of equal Goodness in themselves. But the matter in fact was clean otherwise: for *Mentz* was very strong and well furnisht, whereas *Treves* was laid open and quitted. but then *Mentz* was held by a great Garrison of the Enemies. So that if the *Germans* will have *Mentz*, it must first be taken; if they will have *Treves*, (in the like condition), it must first be fortified. Here therefore ariseth another Question, which of these two things was easier to be done, the Taking of the one, or the Fortifying of the other.

The World knows, and the Confederates feel, what the Taking of *Mentz* hath cost them. It cost them the hard labour of a mighty Army for two Months, wholly maintained the while at their own Charge, and fed with Provisions from home. It cost them a vast Quantity of Ammunition, the Lives of many thousands of their best Men, together with the Destruction of a good part of *Germany* which the *French* effected during that Siege. Of which things, and of some other Particulars, I have spoken more largely before.

As for the Fortification of *Treves*, the great Expence would have been the labour of Men. And the whole Army that besieged *Mentz*, might in one Month have put them in such a Forwardness, that ten thousand Men left in Garrison might have finish'd them in a few Months more; and have defended the Place in the mean time, against all the Force that *France* could then bring against them. Also the very repairing of *Mentz* would have gone a great way in fortifying *Treves*. 'Tis true, the Confederates must have put in great Guns, and Ammunition. But the Ammunition that was spent, and the Guns that were spoil'd at *Mentz*, would plentifully have

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furnish *Treves* with Guns and Ammunition, and all other Necessaries. But *Treves* would have been incommoded by *Montroyal*, which the *Germans* must have left behind them. I answer, Not so much as *Montroyal* would have been by *Treves*, the stronger Garrison: which the *French* must leave behind them, to come to *Montroyal*. Also we may remember, how little *Mastricht* was incommoded, while the *French* held it, by *Namur* and other Places that lay between it and *France*; or the same *Mastricht* by *Ruremond* and *Venlo*, in former times, while there was War between *Spain* and *Holland*.

BUT BESIDE the Incursions of the *French* Garrisons upon the *Rhine*, there is another grand Inconvenience Objected, which the *Germans* (in case they had invaded *France*) must in the mean time have undergone likewise; and that is, the want and loss of the Navigation of that River. In answer to this I must confess, that the Navigation of the *Rhine* is of mighty importance both to *Holland* and *Germany*, by reason of the great Trade carried on between those Countries by that Conveyance. But though it be highly beneficial, yet it is not necessary; and those Countries can live without it. As they have done formerly for many a year, at such times as the *Spaniards* (being in War with *Holland*) were possess'd of *Rhinberg*, or *Wesel*, or some other Places upon the *Rhine*.

I know there are some that will affirm, that this Navigation was absolutely necessary, at this time, to the *German* Armies: for supplying them with several things from *Holland*, which could not be brought them other ways. But if those Armies had carried the War to the *Mose*, which was their own up as far as *Namur*, they would not have stood in much need of the Navigation of the *Rhine*. But if the *Rhine* must be cleared, a strong Invasion of *France* might have been the readiest way to do it. It being highly probable (as I

have ſaid before), that the *French* would thereby have been forced to abandon their Places upon the *Rhine*, the better to defend their own Country. Moreover though the Navigation of this River were never ſo pretious a Commodity, yet it might be bought too dear. And ſurely the Confederates have had a hard bargain of it. It coming at the price of thoſe long and difficult Sieges, which (according to what hath been ſhewed already) have brought ſo many and ſo great Evils upon them. I confeſs the clearing of the *Rhine* to *Collen* (which is almoſt the half of what hath been done) was a good and eaſie bargain: being effected by taking *Rhinberg* and *Keiſerwert*, in a ſhort time and with little loſs. But that which was got by taking *Mentz* and *Bon*, was too dear of all Conſcience.

THUS I HAVE ſhewed my Reaſons for Invading *France*, and anſwer'd the Objections againſt it. I ſhould now deſcend to other Particulars relating to this War. But theſe may be the Subject of another Letter: this is too long already. If I ſhould go on, though I have equal Candor for all the Illuſtrious Actors, yet 'tis like I may give my Opinion (freely, but ſincerely) that ſome Men have done better then others. I confeſs, for thoſe that perform gallant Actions, if I might have my Will, I would make their Names ſhine. *So ſhall it be done to Him, whom the King delighteth to Honour*: was ſaid when *Mordecai* rid in pomp. And they that have Pens, though they be not Kings or Princes, yet they can beſtow good words upon thoſe whom they delight to honour. But I do not pretend to theſe things: I am not one of thoſe Writers, who (as *Barclay* expreſſes it) *Dividunt Mortalibus Famam*. To me it is ſufficient that I have the Honour to be

May it pleaſe your Lordſhip,

Your Lordſhips thrice humble
and truly devoted Servant

POSTSCRIPT.

I Beg leave of your Lordſhip to make a ſmall Addition to what I have written. There are ſome that will argue yet further for theſe difficult Sieges. They will grant it to be very convenient, that the Confederates ſhould carry the War into the Enemies Country. but all in good time. it was fit they ſhould clear the *Rhine* this year, that they might with greater Force and Advantage invade *France* the next. But how did they know what the next year would bring forth? If there were nothing elſe, a League of ſo many Parts is ſubject to many Miſchances, and is much eaſier broken then made. They had now an Opportunity of Conquering *France*: which was to be embraced with Readineſs; I had almoſt ſaid, with Greedineſs. Such an Opportunity they muſt not think to meet with every day. This next year, I doubt, they will not have it: when they are not like to be ſo ſtrong, and the *French* much ſtronger. If they have it, it is to be wiſh'd that they would uſe it. But if they are ſtill for hard Sieges, if they like that Sport; there are Things yet left which will find them Play; and (as Mr. *Bayes* doth phraſe it) will rub their Gums. To inſtance in a few, there is *Montroyal*, and there is *Philipsburg*, with the other remaining Places upon the *Rhine*. And why ſhould not the Upper *Rhine* be clear'd as well as the Lower? Alſo the City of *Treves* is now making fit for them. But the *Elector Palatine* will think himſelf undone for want of *Philipsburg*: and probably will uſe all his Intereſt, which is very great, to engage the reſt upon it. So the Duke of *Saxony* and the *Landgrave* carried it for the Siege of *Mentz*. they would not be in danger of that Garriſon, though they were fair and far off. So likewiſe the *Dutch* took a great deal of pains, and were out a great deal of Money, to get the Duke of *Brandenburg*

Brandenburg to take *Bon* for the Archbishop of *Collen*. The *Dutch* are not often mistaken; but now I think they were. For the Duke might have done both Himself and Them much better Service, by joyning Prince *Waldeck*, then by attacqning *Bon*. However we may see, that little particular Interests, whether true or fancied, do too often bear down the general. But away with these retailing Projects: a vigorous and powerful Invasion would do all at once.

FINIS.